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 REPLY TO:
 
“THE NEW CLASSICAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION:
 FALSE PATH OR ILLUMINATING COMPLEMENT?”
Laurence S. Seidman
University of Delaware
This well written critique of my paper articulates the conciliatory view that new 
classical economics has been an illuminating complement to Keynesian macroeco-
nomics. This conciliatory view would certainly not satisfy the architects of the new 
classical counter-revolution who intended to overthrow, not complement, Keynesian 
macroeconomics. And despite the useful information and arguments presented in this 
interesting critique, I remain convinced that the new classical economics has been a 
false path for macroeconomics, not an illuminating complement. Let me explain why.
In the section of the critique, “Oil and the Stagﬂ  ation of the 1970s,” the author 
correctly recognizes and notes that Gordon, Blinder, Solow, Tobin, Klein and other 
Keynesians adopted the AD-AS framework during the mid-1970s to integrate supply 
shocks into the Keynesian framework and explain the partly OPEC-driven mid-1970s 
stagﬂ  ation. By the early 1970s Keynesians recognized that the economy has a NAIRU 
(see the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity issues of the early 1970s) so that a 
monetary/ﬁ  scal expansion that pushed the unemployment rate below this NAIRU 
would generate rising inﬂ  ation; Keynesians recognized that the inﬂ  ation of the 1960s, 
and some of the inﬂ  ation of the 1970s, was due to running the unemployment rate 
below the NAIRU. So by the mid-1970s, Keynesians had a complete explanation for 
the stagﬂ  ation of the 1970s based on both AD and AS.
What new contribution did the new classical model make to explaining the stag-
ﬂ  ation of the 1970s? None. In 1973, 1974, and 1975, the unemployment rate rose 
from 4.9% to 5.6% to 8.5% and the inﬂ  ation rate rose from 5.6% to 9.0% to 9.4%? So 
how were these data generated by a new classical economy with instantaneous labor-
market clearing and rational expectations? Incredibly, Lucas and Sargent never even 
tried to answer this simple question. Instead, they spent their entire paper attacking 
Keynesian models of the 1960s. But by the mid-1970s, Keynesian models explained the 
stagﬂ  ation partly by excess demand pushing the unemployment rate below the NAIRU 
(prior to 1974) and partly by the oil supply shock from OPEC. In a later interview 
Lucas excused his exclusive focus on Keynesian models of 1968 by saying he couldn’t 
be expected to respond to a Keynesian model of 1988. But what about a Keynesian 
model of 1978, the year of the conference? Who got it right in 1978: Keynesians like 
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In the second section of the critique, “New Classical Inﬂ  uences on Macroeconomic 
Policymaking,” the author credits new classical economists with their emphasis on 
expectations. But new classical economists did not discover the importance of expec-
tations. Keynes emphasized the crucial role that entrepreneurs’ expectations play in 
driving business investment in plant and equipment, and hence, aggregate demand 
in the economy; and the importance of expectations of inﬂ  ation dominated Brookings 
Institution conferences in the early 1970s (check early 1970s issues of the Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity edited by Keynesians Okun and Perry).
Fed chairmen Martin (in the 1960s) and Burns (in the 1970s) both tried hard to 
shape expectations by publicly and repeatedly emphasizing that they would keep 
inﬂ  ation low. Burns twice helped generate a recession (1969-70 and 1974-75) by tight-
ening money and raising interest rates in order to ﬁ  ght inﬂ  ation. In both episodes 
Burns succeeded in temporarily knocking down inﬂ  ation. The only period when the 
Fed chairman was soft on inﬂ  ation was 1972 when Burns provided stimulus to help 
Nixon’s re-election, and Miller’s few months (1978-79) as chairman during the Carter 
years. Faced with another surge in oil prices in the late 1970s, it took Volcker over 
two years before he succeeded in turning the tide against inﬂ  ation—this time, in 
contrast to Burns, with the help of declining world oil prices. Unfortunately we will 
never know how Volcker and Greenspan would have done if they had been chairmen 
in the 1970s, or how Burns would have done if he faced falling rather than rising oil 
prices. But it is re-writing history to claim that Martin and Burns (except for 1972) 
were softer on inﬂ  ation than Volcker and Greenspan.
One way to see how little new classicals have affected policy-making is to imagine 
the alarm that would have swept through ﬁ  nancial markets had Lucas or Sargent 
or Prescott, rather than Bernanke, been nominated to replace Greenspan. Bernanke 
met with widespread approval because he uses the same Keynesian framework as 
Greenspan and is committed to using counter-cyclical monetary policy to combat 
inﬂ  ation when demand is excessive and combat recession when demand is deﬁ  cient. 
Bernanke may have learned other things from Lucas, but not how to conduct counter-
cyclical monetary policy.
In the section of the critique, “Real Business Cycle Theory,” the author downplays 
its complete failure to explain the Great Depression. Keynesian economists have long 
conceded that after 1933 FDR’s NIRA regulations may have inhibited recovery from 
the Depression. But for three long years from 1930 to the end of 1932, before FDR 
became president, output collapsed and the unemployment rate rose from about 5% 
to an unprecedented (before or since) 20%. What does real business cycle theory (and 
its architect Prescott) have to say about that? Nothing. No, worse than that, it says 
that labor is always on its supply curve (the labor market clears instantaneously) so 
this rise in the unemployment rate was “voluntary” and “optimal.” Incredible.
As for normal times, economists have always recognized that the pace of techno-
logical change varies over time, and affects output growth in the short-run as well as 
the long-run. What is distinct about real business cycle theory is its assertion that 
output is governed by technological shocks, positive and negative (the negative shocks 
are never speciﬁ  ed) hitting an economy in which a competitive labor market always 
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Finally, in the section of the critique, “New Classical Economics in the Textbooks,” 
the author credits new classicals with reducing the use of the phrase “involuntary 
unemployment” in undergraduate textbooks. But the leading textbooks, such as 
Blanchard, Mankiw, Abel/Bernanke, all write favorably about the use of counter-cycli-
cal monetary policy to combat recession as well as inﬂ  ation. In discussing recession, 
these texts do not explicitly discuss involuntary unemployment because it is taken 
for granted—the whole discussion and analysis takes it as obvious that unemploy-
ment generated by recession is involuntary and non-optimal and should therefore 
be combated by counter-cyclical monetary policy. These texts show how a shift up 
of the aggregate supply curve can generate some inﬂ  ation and create a dilemma for 
the Fed (which to ﬁ  ght—inﬂ  ation or recession?)—this “cost push” inﬂ  ation is usually 
illustrated by oil prices rather than wages because oil prices were more important 
in the 1970s, but the framework can handle either one. A genuinely new classical 
undergraduate textbook would need to contend, in plain English, that counter-cycli-
cal monetary policy should not be used to combat recessions because recessions do 
not imply involuntary unemployment. Such assumptions can hide nicely behind 
mathematics in graduate programs, but would meet with disbelief if stated in plain 
English to undergraduates.
In the conclusion of the critique, the author notes the value of the “interplay of 
ideas” which helps avoid “complacency.” Yes, complacency is harmful and criticism 
is often productive. But that doesn’t mean that any criticism is as good as its tar-
get, or that progress is always made by taking as much from one as from the other. 
Sometimes it is best for the critic to defeat the target; and sometimes it is best for the 
target to defeat the critic. Which applies to new classical economics? If it turns out 
that the emperor has no clothes (despite lots of mathematics), then it is best to say 
it. So I can’t join the effort at conciliation. New classical economics is a false path for 
macroeconomics, not an illuminating complement.